De ce bunurile nu pot fi decât drepturile subiective și de ce toate drepturile subiective pot fi bunuri (I). Interpretarea eronată a moștenirii romane

Rezumat

The legal concept of good appears to be inextricably linked to that of value. Given that the traditional Romano-German civil law inspired by the vision of the glossators and the materialism of the Napoleonic Civil Code considered that socio-economic inter-human relations are grafted on the triad of things-goods-rights, a closer look at the created relationships cannot help us leads to another conclusion than that the notion of good is confused with that of right. This latter concept, eminently intellectual, is the only one that can be attributed the quality of a patrimonial asset. The Roman notion of "res" carries a complexity that extracts it from the simple sphere of the notion of "good" as classical law tried to position it, it rather signifies a thing in a legal sense, a thing over which it bears a patrimonial right. It is incorrect from a legal point of view and outside of Roman legal thinking the thesis according to which the right of ownership is incorporated in the thing on which it bears.